SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000100090002-6

IN 49006

S E C R E T 110203Z CITE SAIGON 1826 [redacted] 25X1

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

25X1 FOR [redacted]

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

1. SO FAR, OUR MISSION FRUSTRATINGLY UNPRODUCTIVE SINCE MACV STONEWALLING, OBVIOUSLY UNDER ORDERS. UNLESS OR UNTIL I CAN PERSUADE WESTMORELAND TO AMEND THOSE ORDERS, SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF EVIDENCE OR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE.

2. SINCE ROOT PROBLEMS, AS WE ALL RECOGNIZE, LIE MUCH MORE IN POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS REALM THAN IN SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE, I HAD HOPED TO GET SHARP, WESTMORELAND, KOMER AND BUNKER AGREEMENT ON PRESENTATIONAL PACKAGING QUESTION BEFORE ADDRESSING EVIDENCE AND SPECIFIC FIGURES. VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, TORPEDOED THIS PLAN. IN BANGKOK ON 8 SEPTEMBER SHARP'S MORNING OBLIGATIONS AT SEATO AND MY 1415 PLAN MADE 1300 - 1330 ONLY POSSIBLE TIME FOR OUR MEETING. AS SHARP COMING UP EMBASSY STAIRS, HE GRABBED BY HANNAH WHO, WHEN INFORMED SHARP GOING TO 1300 APPOINTMENT WITH

25X1 [redacted] WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE, STOOD STIFFILY ON HIS PREROGATIVES AS DCM AND SWEPT SHARP INTO HIS OFFICE. THUS I MISSED SHARP, THOUGH I WAS ABLE TO GIVE GIST OF [redacted] POSITION TO ADMIRAL 25X1

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READY. WHEN TEAM ARRIVED SAIGON 8 SEPTEMBER, WE LEARNED BOTH WESTMORELAND AND KOMER HAD TAKEN OFF FOR WEEKEND OF LEAVE IN, RESPECTIVELY, MANILA AND BANGKOK. THUS WORKING SESSIONS HAD TO COMMENCE WITHOUT CONTROLLING POLICY QUESTIONS RESOLVED.

3. ON 9 SEPTEMBER, MACV J2 AND STAFF DEVOTED WHOLE DAY TO BRIEFING US ON REVISED MACV ESTIMATE, WHICH WIDENED RATHER THAN NARROWED OUR DIFFERENCES. MACV NOW STICKING ON 119,000 MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE FIGURE, 29,000 ADMIN SERVICES, 65,000 GUERRILLAS AND 85,000 POLITICAL CADRE FOR {BY NO COINCIDENCE} MILITARY AND POLITICAL OR TOTAL OF 298,000. MACV ALSO ADAMANT THAT NO FIGURE OR QUANTIFIED ESTIMATE BE GIVEN FOR OTHER ELEMENTS VC ORGANIZATION SUCH AS SELF DEFENSE, SECRET SELF DEFENSE, ASSAULT YOUTH, ETC. {14.3 DRAFT FIGURES ARE 121,000 MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE, 40-60,000 RANGE ON ADMIN SERVICE, 60-100,000 RANGE ON GUERRILLAS, 90,000 ON POLITICAL CADRE, AND 120,000 FOR OTHERS.}

4. 10 SEPTEMBER DEVOTED TO SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF EVIDENCE AND METHODOLOGY ON ADMIN SERVICE AND GUERRILLAS. WE DID NOT ARGUE 2,000 DROP IN MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE {WHICH PROBABLY DEFENSIBLE} OR 5,000 DROP IN POLITICAL CADRE WHICH, AT THE MOMENT, WAS SECONDARY ISSUE. I ATTEMPTED TO CLEAR ATMOSPHERE BY OPENING SESSION WITH

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STRONG PITCH FOR CAREFUL LOOK AT DATA CATEGORY BY CATEGORY, WITHOUT CONSIDERING ULTIMATE TOTAL UNTIL ANALYSIS EACH SEPARATE CATEGORY COMPLETED, AND BY OUTLINING HOW PRESENTATIONAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS ISSUE COULD BE HANDLED IN FASHION BENEFICIAL TO MACV AND US GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY WHEREVER WE COME OUT. I ALSO EXPLAINED, IN LOW KEY AND WITH ALL POSSIBLE TACT, THAT NATIONAL ESTIMATES WERE DCI ESTIMATES; THAT OTHER USIB MEMBERS COULD DISSENT, BUT NO ONE COULD TELL THE USIB CHAIRMAN WHAT HIS ESTIMATE HAD TO BE. MY REMARKS SEEMED WELL RECEIVED BUT HAD NO INFLUENCE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF GENERAL DAVIDSON OR HIS SUBORDINATES.

5. 14.3 CASE ON ADMIN SERVICE AND GUERRILLA FIGURES MOST ABLY PRESENTED BY MESSRS. ADAMS AND HYLAND. THOUGH TO DISCOMFITURE OF OUR HOSTS THIS CASE PATENTLY STRONGER THAN MACV'S, IT WAVED ASIDE BY GENERAL DAVIDSON. TWO EXAMPLES CONVEY THE PICTURE: ESTIMATE DRAFT FIGURES INCLUDE 17,000 ADMIN SERVICE AT DISTRICT LEVEL; MACV ONLY ACCEPTS 5,000. MR. ADAMS EXPLAINED HOW OUR DISTRICT LEVEL FIGURE DEVELOPED FROM ADMIN TO COMBAT TROOP RATIO EXTRAPOLATED FROM DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE COVERING 14 DISTRICTS. GENERAL DAVIDSON TORE INTO THIS, SAYING 14 DISTRICT BASE TOO SLIM FOR EXTRAPOLATION OF VALID NATIONWIDE FIGURE. SOON THEREAFTER,

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HOWEVER, OFFICER WHO PRESENTED MACV CASE ON THIS POINT HAD TO ADMIT (IN RESPONSE DAVIDSON'S OWN QUESTIONS) THAT MACV 5,000 FIGURE BASED ON ONLY THREE DISTRICTS AND, EVEN HERE, MACV HAD MADE DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT IN WHAT DOCUMENTS ACTUALLY SAID. NO MATTER, DAVIDSON WOULD NOT BUDGE. WHEN CHALLENGING MACV'S ADAMANT REFUSAL TO QUANTIFY ESTIMATE OF IRREGULARS (SELF DEFENSE, SECRET SELF DEFENSE), WE POINTED OUT 14.3 DRAFT FIGURES TAKEN UNCHANGED FROM JULY 1967 MACV STUDY ON IRREGULARS. AGAIN, NO MATTER, NO GIVE. EVEN DIA TEAM MOST IRRITATED. AFTER SESSION, [redacted] GRUMBLED "WE DID NOT TRAVEL 8,000 MILES TO BE INSULTED."

25X1

6. VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL INDICATORS -- MACV JUGGLING OF FIGURES ITS OWN ANALYSTS PRESENTED DURING AUGUST DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, MACV BEHAVIOR, AND TACIT OR OBLIQUE LUNCHTIME AND CORRIDOR ADMISSIONS BY MACV OFFICERS, INCLUDING DAVIDSON -- ALL POINT TO INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION THAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND (WITH KOMER'S ENCOURAGEMENT) HAS GIVEN INSTRUCTION TANTAMOUNT TO DIRECT ORDER THAT VC STRENGTH TOTAL WILL NOT EXCEED 300,000 CEILING. RATIONALE SEEMS TO BE THAT ANY HIGHER FIGURE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY OPTIMISTIC AND WOULD GENERATE UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF CRITICISM FROM THE PRESS. THIS ORDER OBVIOUSLY MAKES IT

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PAGE 5 SAIGON 1826 S E C R E T

IMPOSSIBLE FOR MACV TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS OR MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF EVIDENCE OR OUR REAL SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENTS, WHICH I STRONGLY SUSPECT ARE NEGLIGIBLE.

7. I HOPE TO SEE KOMER AND WESTMORELAND TOMORROW (11 SEPT) AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO LOOSEN THIS STRAITJACKET. UNLESS I CAN, WE ARE WASTING OUR TIME. TO SHOW, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE WILLING TO GO EVEN BEYOND THE LAST MILE, MESSRS. HYLAND, [redacted] AND ADAMS ARE GOING TO SIT DOWN WITH MACV'S WORKING LEVEL ANALYSTS AND REVIEW THE EVIDENCE ON ADMIN SERVICE, GUERRILLAS AND POLITICAL CADRE DOCUMENT BY DOCUMENT. 25X1

8. FOR COSMETIC REASONS, GIVEN THE SITUATION AND THE FACT THAT KOMER AND WESTMORELAND WILL NOT ARRIVE UNTIL 11 SEPTEMBER, IT WOULD BE A POLITICAL ERROR FOR US TO LEAVE ON 12 SEPTEMBER AS PLANNED. THUS WE WILL HAVE TO REMAIN AN ADDITIONAL DAY OR TWO FOR APPEARANCES SAKE IF NOTHING ELSE. IF I CAN BUDGE WESTMORELAND, THIS WHOLE MATTER CAN BE RESOLVED TO EVERYONE'S SATISFACTION IN A FEW HOURS OF SERIOUS DISCUSSION. IF I CAN NOT, NO AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. 25X1

25X1 9. [redacted] HAVE BOTH SEEN THIS MESSAGE. [redacted] LEFT AFTERNOON 10 SEPTEMBER.

S E C R E T

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SEP 11 1553Z
DIRECTOR 34454

S E C R E T

TO: PRIORITY SAIGON

25X1 FOR [redacted]

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

RE SAIG 1826 (IN-49006), AGREE YOU SHOULD REMAIN UNTIL YOU HAVE HAD SESSION WITH BOTH WESTMORELAND AND KOMER. PLEASE LET ME KNOW OUTCOME, AND PLEASE CLEAR WITH ME YOUR DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON. IN OTHER WORDS, TEAM SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON UNTIL WE GIVE APPROVAL.

(END OF MESSAGE)

/S/
RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

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12 SEP 67 IN 50294

S E C R E T 121215Z CITE SAIGON 1925 [redacted] 25X1

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

SECTION 1 OF 2

FOR MR. HELSM ONLY FROM MR. CARVER

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

REF: SAIGON 1926

BEGIN TEXT

"SUBJECT: JOINT CIA-DIA-INR REPRESENTATIVES' POSITION ON VIET CONG STRENGTH ESTIMATES"

"AFTER REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE, METHODOLOGY AND WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS WHICH LED TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE 28 AUGUST DRAFT OF NIE 14.3-67 IN LIGHT OF OUR SAIGON DISCUSSIONS WITH THE STAFF OF COMUSMACV, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE JOINTLY BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING FIGURES AND DEFINITIONS, WHICH MODIFY THOSE NOW APPEARING IN THE DRAFT NIE, WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE WASHINGTON PRINCIPALS:

VIET CONG MILITARY FORCE

MAIN AND LOCAL FORCES: 119,000 - (119,000)

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ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES		
GUERRILLAS	35,000	45,000
TOTAL	75,000	95,000
	229,000	259,000

"WE ESTIMATE THAT THE PRESENT STRENGTH OF THE VIET CONG POLITICAL CADRE STRUCTURE IS IN THE 80,000 TO 90,000 RANGE.

"THE NIE WOULD HAVE NO AGGREGATE TOTAL OF THE VIET CONG MILITARY FORCE AND THE VIET CONG POLITICAL CADRE STRUCTURE SINCE WE BELIEVE SUCH AN AGGREGATE TOTAL IS INHERENTLY MEANINGLESS AND MISLEADING.

"ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, THE FIGURE NOTED ABOVE WOULD BE PRESENTED IN AN EXPLANATORY PARAGRAPH A DRAFT COPY OF WHICH IS ATTACHED HERETO.

"THERE WOULD BE NO NUMERICAL ESTIMATE ON THE SIZE AND STRENGTH OF THE SELF DEFENSE, SECRET SELF-DEFENSE, AND OTHER SIMILAR VC ORGANIZATIONS. INSTEAD, THESE WOULD BE TEXTUALLY EXPLAINED AS INDICATED IN DRAFT PARAGRAPHS WHICH ALSO ARE ATTACHED TO THIS MEMORANDUM.

"IN CONNECTION WITH THESE "IRREGULAR" ORGANIZATIONS (AS INDICATED IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL DAVIDSON), WE WOULD LIKE TO INITIATE A JOINT WASHINGTON - SAIGON EFFORT TO DEVELOP

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A METHODOLOGY TO INSURE THAT LOSSES INCURRED BY THESE IRREGULARS DO NOT DISTORT OUR INPUT - LOSS CALCULATIONS APPLIED TO DETERMINING ATTRITION ON OR THE FUTURE STRENGTHS OF THE VC MILITARY FORCE AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE.

"WITH REGARD TO INPUT - LOSS CALCULATING, WE WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE RECEIVING A COPY OF [redacted] 'CROSSOVER' BRIEFING AND HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEND YOU OUR CONSIDERED COMMENTS ON THIS VERY INTERESTING PRESENTATION BEFORE ITS ARGUMENT OR CONCLUSIONS ARE SURFACED OUTSIDE OF OFFICIAL CHANNELS. WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE COPIES OF THE BRIEFING WE RECEIVED ON CURRENT RECRUITMENT RATES AND [redacted] EXCELLENT BRIEFING ON VC MORALE.

25X1

25X1

"WITH REGARD TO THE FORTHCOMING NIE, ANY TEXT COMUSMACV WISHES TO SUBMIT TO MODIFY PARAGRAPHS IN THE PRESENT DRAFT OR ANY COMUSMACV SUGGESTION FOR ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPHS WILL BE TAKEN BACK TO WASHINGTON FOR CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BY THE INTER-AGENCY COORDINATING PROCESS THROUGH WHICH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE PRODUCED. GEORGE A. CARVER, JR, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE"

BEGIN TEXT ATTACHMENT 1

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"TO FOLLOW THE PARAGRAPH DEFINING ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FORCES AND EXPLAINING THAT WE CANNOT ESTIMATE THE PERSONNEL IN CAMBODIA, LAOS AND ACROSS THE DMZ:"

"26. WE CANNOT BE CONFIDENT OF THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FORCES AT ANY GIVEN TIME. OBVIOUSLY, "THEIR STRENGTH SHOULD STAND IN SOME RATIO TO THE COMBAT FORCES THEY SUPPORT. INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT STRENGTH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AT THE LOWER LEVELS IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A FIRM ESTIMATE. MOREOVER, THIS FORCE HAS ALMOST CERTAINLY SUFFERED ATTRITION AND HAS PROBABLY BEEN DRAWN DOWN TO PROVIDE SOME COMBAT REPLACEMENTS. IN LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WE ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE NOW ABOUT 35,000-45,000 ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE PERSONNEL WHO ARE PERFORMING ESSENTIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS, FULL TIME. IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, THERE ARE SEVERAL THOUSANDS WHO ARE ASSIGNED MARGINAL FUNCTIONS, NOT NECESSARILY FULL TIME. AND, OF COURSE, ALMOST ANYONE UNDER VC CONTROL CAN BE AND IS IMPRESSED INTO SERVICE TO PERFORM SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATIVE OR SUPPORT TASKS WHEN LOCAL CONDITIONS REQUIRE HIS SERVICES." END TEXT ATTACHMENT 1

BEGIN TEXT ATTACHMENT 2

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"OTHER COMMUNIST ELEMENTS:"

"THE COMMUNISTS MAKE A DELIBERATE EFFORT TO ORGANIZE MOST OF THE PEOPLE UNDER THEIR CONTROL INTO VARIOUS WORK FORCES AND SEMI-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, AND WHEN OCCASION DEMANDS, ALMOST EVERY ABLE-BODIED PERSON UNDER VC CONTROL MAY BE CALLED ON TO SUPPORT THE WAR EFFORT. AMONG THE MORE SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONS "ARE THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES, SECRET SELF-DEFENSE FORCES AND OTHER GROUPS SUCH AS THE "ASSAULT YOUTH". THE SD IS REGULARLY REPORTED AND PORTRAYED BY THE COMMUNISTS AS A MILITARY ORGANIZATION SIMILAR TO VILLAGE AND HAMLET GUERRILLAS, BUT IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR ORGANIZATION AND MISSION DIFFER. THEY INCLUDE PERSONNEL OF ALL AGES, A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES, ELDERLY PERSONS, AND CHILDREN. THEY ARE LARGELY UNARMED AND ONLY PARTIALLY TRAINED. THE DUTIES OF SELF-DEFENSE UNITS INCLUDE THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER, AND PROTECTION OF VILLAGES AND HAMLETS IN ENEMY-CONTROLLED TERRITORY. THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORTIFICATIONS, PROPA-GANDA AND INTELLIGENCE WORK. THEIR EXISTENCE POSES AN IMPEDIMENT PARTICULARLY TO THE ALLIED PACIFICATION EFFORTS. SELF DEFENSE FORCES DO NOT LEAVE THEIR HOME AREAS, AND MEMBERS GENERALLY PERFORM THEIR DUTIES ON A PART-TIME BASIS. IN THEIR DEFENSIVE

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CLOSE

IN 50294

S E C R E T 121325 CITE SIAGON 1925 [redacted] 25X1

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

FINAL SECTION OF 2

FOR MR. HELMS ONLY FROM MR. CARVER

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

ROLE, THEY INFLICT CASUALTIES ON ALLIED FORCES.

"SECRET SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ARE AN ADDITIONAL ELEMENT WHICH OPERATE IN GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED AND CONTESTED AREAS. THEY PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE COMMUNIST EFFORT, PRIMARILY BY CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND AS A RESIDUE OF THE COMMUNIST PRESENCE IN SUCH AREAS.

"DURING THE PAST YEAR WE HAVE LEARNED MORE ABOUT A VC ORGANIZATION CALLED 'ASSAULT YOUTH'. THEY SERVE FULL-TIME AT DISTRICT LEVEL AND ABOVE, AND THEY ARE ORGANIZED INTO BATTALIONS, COMPANIES, AND PLATOONS. ALTHOUGH SOME ARE ARMED, THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT CONSIDER THEM AS A COMBAT FORCE; THEIR PRIMARY MISSION APPEARS TO BE A LOGISTICAL ONE, FREQUENTLY IN BATTLEFIELD AREAS. SOME OF THE CASUALTIES INFLICTED BY ALLIED FORCES IN BATTLE ARE SUSTAINED BY THE 'ASSAULT YOUTH'. THIS ORGANIZATION ALSO SERVCES AS A MANPOWER POOL AND TRAINING PROGRAM FOR YOUTH WHO LATER GO

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INTO THE VC MAIN AND LOCAL FORCES. LITTLE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO INDICATE THE STRENGTH OF DISTRIBUTION OF THE 'ASSAULT YOUTH.'

"OUR CURRENT EVIDENCE DOES NOT ENABLE US TO ESTIMATE THE PRESENT SIZE OF THESE GROUPS WITH ANY MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE. SOME DOCUMENTS SUGGEST THAT IN EARLY 1966 THE AGGREGATE SIZE OF THE SELF DEFNESE GROUP WAS THEN ON THE ORDER OF 150,000. THESE 'IRREGULAR' COMPONENTS, HOWEVER, HAVE UNQUESTIONABLY SUFFERED ATTRITION SINCE THAT TIME, AS WELL AS AN APPRECIABLE DECLINE IN QUALITY, BECAUSE OF CASUALTIES, UPGRADING OF SOME OF THEIR MEMBERS INTO THE GUERRILLAS OR OTHER VC MILITARY COMPONENTS AND, PARTICULARLY, THE SHRINKAGE IN VC CONTROL OF POPULATED AREAS. THOUGH IN AGGREGATE NUMBERS THESE GROUPS ARE STILL LARGE, AND THEY STILL CONSTITUTE A PART OF THE OVERALL COMMUNIST EFFORT, THEY ARE NOT OFFENSIVE MILITARY FORCES AND SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE MILITARY ORDER OF BATTLE TOTAL, EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THEIR MEMBERS ARE PROBABLY INCLUDED IN OUR CASUALTY FIGURES AND THEY ACCOUNT FOR A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE CHIEU HOIS." END TEXT ATTACHMENT 2.

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12 SEP 67 IN 50318

S E C R E T 121335Z CITE SAIGON 1926 [redacted] 25X1

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

SECTION 1 OF 2 25X1

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

25X1 FOR [redacted]

[redacted]

REFS: A. SAIGON 1826*(IN 49006)

B. DIRECTOR 34454**

C. SAIGON 1925 (IN 50294)

1. SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12 FULL OF ACTION AND BEHIND SCENES SCURRYING IN MACV, BUT HAVE PRODUCED LITTLE MOVEMENT. AT PRESENT, WE ARE AT AN IMPASSE. I HAVE SEEN KOMER ONCE AND AM HAVING DINNER WITH HIM TONIGHT. I SEE WESTMORELAND (WITH KOMER, DAVIDSON, THE DIA PRINCIPALS, AND MR. TEARE OF INR TOMORROW, 13 SEPTEMBER). THIS MAY CLEAR THE AIR, BUT IT MAY LOCK US IN WHERE WE NOW ARE. I WILL SEE THE AMBASSADOR AFTER THE WESTMORELAND SESSION.

2. ON 11 SEPTEMBER, MESSRS. HYLAND, ADAMS, AND [redacted] 25X1 REVIEWED THE DETAILED EVIDENCE ON, RESPECTIVELY, ADMIN SERVICES, GUERRILLA AND POLITICAL CADRE. MR. ADAMS MANAGED TO GET MACV'S GUERRILLA FIGURES APPRECIABLY RAISED, MR.

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HYLAND MADE NO CHANGES IN MACV'S ADMIN SERVICE HOLDINGS, BUT SAW IN DETAIL HOW WEAK THEIR CASE WAS (E.G., A DOCUMENT USED TO PROVIDE THE MODEL FOR ONE OF THE THREE DISTRICTS ON WHICH MACV'S DISTRICT-LEVEL CASE WAS BASED HAD A PARAGRAPH MACV DID NOT CITE, PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR MR. ADAMS' EXTRAPOLATED ADMIN TO COMBAT RATIO AT DISTRICT LEVEL). [redacted] MADE NO CHANGES, BUT ON 11 SEPTEMBER OUR POSITIONS ON POLITICAL CADRE WERE VERY CLOSE. 25X1

3. ON 11 SEPTEMBER, GENERAL DAVIDSON AND I SPENT TWO HOURS WITH MR. KOMER, ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL GODDING AND [redacted] (DIA DELEGATION HEAD). I REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE ESTIMATE, ITS VARIOUS DRAFTS, THE AUGUST WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS (IN WHICH MACV'S REPRESENTATIVES HAD PARTICIPATED), THE RATIONALE FOR THE FIGURES IN THE 28 AUGUST DRAFT, AND THE RESULTS OF OUR 10 SEPTEMBER CONFERENCE WITH THE MACV STAFF. WHILE COVERING THE LAST POINT, I WAS FREQUENTLY AND SOMETIMES TENDENTIOUSLY INTERRUPTED BY DAVIDSON, PARTICULARLY WHEN I STRESSED THAT OUR SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES WERE PROBABLY NOT GREAT AND COULD SWIFTLY BE RESOLVED IF WE COULD PROCEED CATEGORY BY CATEGORY, WITHOUT 25X1

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ANY WEATHER EYE ON A FINAL TOTAL. (DAVIDSON ANGRILY ACCUSED ME OF IMPUGNING HIS INTEGRITY SINCE HE HAD ASSURED ME HE HAD NO PRE-DETERMINED TOTAL.) I PRESENTED MY THOUGHTS ON THE PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM, NOTING THAT A CLEARING OF THE ATMOSPHERE, NO MATTER HOW MUCH SHORT TERM STATIC PRODUCED, WOULD BENEFIT OUR CREDIBILITY POSTURE, THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH A VALID BASE LINE WE WOULD NEVER HUAQUVHRIUSK* RETROACTIVELY ADJUST UPWARD, AND THAT IF MACV WENT TO THE PRESS WITH THE LINE TAUT AFTER AN EXHAUSTIVE REVIEW OF ALL ITS EVIDENCE AND METHODOLOGY, IT CAME OUT WITH A MILITARY PLUS POLITICAL TOTAL OF (BY STRANGE COINCIDENCE) 298,000, IT REALLY WOULD BE CRUCIFIED.

4. KOMER THEN LAUNCHED INTO AN HOUR-PLUS MONOLOGUE, REVIEWING HIS AND WESTMORELAND'S PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESS, THEIR FRUSTRATING INABILITY TO CONVINCE THE PRESS (HENCE THE PUBLIC) OF THE GREAT PROGRESS BEING MADE, AND THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF SAYING NOTHING THAT WOULD DETRACT FROM THE IMAGE OF PROGRESS OR SUPPORT OF THE THESIS OF STALEMATE. HE THEN OPENED A STRONG ATTACK ON THE ESTIMATE DRAFT, FAULTING THE QUALITY OF ITS PROSE AND ITS ANALYSIS AND CALLING IT A SLOPPY,

*BEING SVCD

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THIN AND ALTOGETHER DISAPPOINTING PIECE OF WORK, OUT OF DATE WHERE IT WAS NOT ACTUALLY WRONG. HE NOTED THAT OCI AND ONE HAD ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF ANALYSTS WORKING ON VIETNAM, NONE OF WHOM KNEW MUCH ABOUT IT. THE AGENCY'S ANALYSIS, CONSEQUENTLY, COULD NOT EXPECT TO COMPARE IN DEPTH AND QUALITY TO THAT OF MACV, WITH ITS BATTERIES OF SPECIALISTS. HE HAD MUCH MORE FAITH IN MACV'S FIGURES THAN OURS (THOUGH WE THOUGHT MACV'S TOO HIGH) AND WOULD HENCE RECOMMEND TO WESTMORELAND

THAT OURS

BE REJECTED. HE DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT HE AGREED THAT THE 298,000 TOTAL HAD TO BE CHANGED (FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS REASONS) AND AGREED WITH ME THAT THE FINAL ESTIMATE SHOULD SHOW RANGES RATHER THAN SINGLE FIGURES. HE WAS ADAMANT, HOWEVER, IN INSISTING THAT THEIRS MUST NOT BE ANY QUANTIFICATION OF THE IRREGULAR FORCES ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PRESS WOULD ADD ALL FIGURES, TOGETHER AND HENCE QUANTIFYING THE IRREGULARS WOULD PRODUCE A POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE TOTAL OVER 400,000.

5. THE ATMOSPHERE CHANGED MARKEDLY AFTER THE KOMER SESSION. DAVIDSON CHORTED HIS DELIGHT AT SCUTTLING THE 298,000 TOTAL. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE GENERAL GODDING WORK OUT THE SPREADS. I SUGGESTED WE DEVELOP THE SPREADS TOGETHER, CATEGORY

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BY CATEGORY, BUT DAVIDSON DEMURRED. SHORTLY BEFORE WE LEFT, HOWEVER, DAVIDSON'S DEPUTY SIDLED UP TO MR. HYLAND TO ASK "HOW WOULD YOU GET TO 309,000, SHOW ME AND YOU'LL HAVE A PROPOSITION.

6. WHEN WE WENT TO MACV ON 12 SEPTEMBER GENERAL DAVIDSON AND GENERAL GODDING HANDED ME A WHITE CARD WITH THE FOLLOWING TYPED THEREON: QUOTE MAIN AND LOCALS 119,000, ADM SVC 25,000 - 35,000, GUERRILLAS 75,000 - 95,000, TOTAL 219,000 - 249,000 (MEAN 234,000), POLITICAL CADRE 70,000 - 80,000 - SELF DEFENSE AND SECRET SELF DEFENSE, NO QUANTIFICATION. OPTIMISTIC ATMOSPHERE IN NIE. UNQUOTE.

7. I SUGGESTED WE GET OUR ANALYSTS TOGETHER AND REVIEW THE SPREADS CATEGORY BY CATEGORY. DAVIDSON REFUSED, SAYING THAT WAS MACV'S FINAL OFFER, NOT SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION. WE SHOULD TAKE OR LEAVE IT.

8. I THEN CONVENED THE ENTIRE WASHINGTON DELEGATION TO SEE IF WE COULD HAMMER OUT A POSITION DIA AND INR WOULD JOIN US IN. IT TOOK SIX HOURS, BUT WE SUCCEEDED. I THEN WROTE OUR POSITION OUT AS A FORMAL MEMORANDUM (TEXT IN REF C) WHICH I PRESENTED TO GENERAL DAVIDSON AT 1800 HOURS.

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12 SEPT 67 IN 50318

S E C R E T 121335 CITE SAIGON 1926 [redacted] 25X1

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

25X1 FOR [redacted]

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9. YOU WILL NOTE I HAVE MADE A MAJOR CONCESSION IN NOT QUANTIFYING THE IRREGULARS. IT SEEMED TO ME THIS WAS MACV'S MAJOR STICKING POINT, THAT OUR FIGURES WERE NOT ALL THAT FIRM, AND THAT THE PROSE TEXT ADOPTED MAKES IT CLEAR THAT WE HAVE THE HUNDRED THOUSAND RANGE IN MIND EVEN THOUGH NO PRECISE FIGURE IS USED.

10. FOR THE REST, WE BUY MACV'S POSITION ON MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE AND THEIR NEW POSITION (COURTESY OF MR. ADAMS) ON GUERRILLAS. WE ARE STICKING ON THE POLITICAL CADRE FIGURE EVERYONE HAD AGREED TO (IT IS IN A 1 SEPTEMBER MACV STUDY) UNTIL TODAY, WHEN MACV WHACKED IT JUST TO GET THE TOTAL DOWN. ON ADMIN SERVICES, I AND MY COLLEAGUES BELIEVE WE HAVE GIVEN ALL THE GROUND WE CAN WITHOUT VIOLATING OUR PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY.

11. AFTER READING MY MEMORANDUM, DAVIDSON SAID THIS CLOSED THE ISSUE. MACV HAD MADE ITS FINAL OFFER AND THERE WOULD BE TWO SETS OF FIGURES. I SAID THERE HAD TO BE SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION SINCE I WAS UNDER YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO DISCUSS THIS WHOLE SUBJECT PERSONALLY WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE WESTMORELAND SESSION IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR 0830 TOMORROW (13 SEPTEMBER). IF HE

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REFUSES TO REMOVE THE STRICTURE OF A PRE-DETERMINED TOTAL, FIXED ON PUBLIC RELATIONS GROUNDS, WE CAN GO NO FURTHER (UNLESS YOU INSTRUCT OTHERWISE). IF HE LIFTS THIS STRICTURE, MACV'S ANALYSTS ARE DYING TO HAVE OUR REVISED FIGURES ACCEPTED.

12. I WILL REPORT TOMORROW ON THE KOMER DINNER AND WESTMORELAND MEETING, AND WOULD WELCOME HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE BEFORE THE LATTER. WE HAVE RESERVATIONS FOR THURSDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER (PUTTING US IN WASHINGTON 17 SEPTEMBER), BUT WILL NOT LEAVE WITHOUT YOUR EXPLICIT AUTHORIZATION PER REFERENCE B.

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S E C R E T

SERVICE

SAIGON 1926 PARA 3	12 SEP 67	50318 A
STA & NR	DATE	IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"WE WOULD NEVER HAVE TO RETROACTIVELY ADJUST UPWARD AND THAT"

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13 SEP 67 IN 51159

S E C R E T 131225Z CITE SAIGON 1983 [redacted] 25X1

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

SECTION 1 OF 2

25X1 FOR [redacted]

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

(*Messages to [redacted] concerning 25X1 25X1
the VC strength estimates.)

REF: A. SAIGON 1925* (IN 502944)

B. SAIGON 1926* (IN 503184)

1. CIRCLE NOW SQUARED, CHIEFLY AS RESULT OF WESTMORELAND SESSION (AND PERHAPS KOMER DINNER). WE NOW HAVE AGREED SET OF FIGURES WESTMORELAND ENDORSES. MISSION SEEMS ON VERGE OF SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION, THOUGH FINAL T'S TO BE CROSSED TOMORROW.

2. KOMER DINNER WAS RELAXED, FRANK, CORDIAL AND (MOST USEFULLY) PRIVATE. WE REVIEWED WHOLE ESTIMATE EXERCISE. I GAVE BLUNT OUTLINE OF WEAKNESSES IN MACV CASE, OF PECULIAR MACV BEHAVIOR, AND OF FACT THAT AGREEMENT IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS CLIMATE IMPROVED ENOUGH TO PERMIT SERIOUS DISCUSSION. KOMER DID NOT AGREE WITH OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION AND REPEATED SOME CAUSTIC REMARKS ABOUT THE ESTIMATE BUT HE DID LISTEN.

3. ON MORNING 13 SEPTEMBER, GENERAL DAVIDSON ADVISED ME WESTMORELAND MEETING WOULD DO NOTHING BUT FORMALIZE OUR IMPASSE,

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SINCE WESTMORELAND WOULD NEVER ACCEPT OUR POSITION. WHEN MEETING CONVENED (WITH ABRAMS, KOMER, GENERAL SIDLE (PIO) AND INR REPS ATTENDING). DAVIDSON GAVE RATHER BIASED ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS, NOTING OUR IMPASSE ON FIGURES, SAYING HE THOUGHT OUR PARAGRAPH WRITTEN TO AVOID QUANTIFYING IRREGULARS (LAST PARA REF A) UNACCEPTABL AND OUTLINING HIS DRAFT CABLE BY WHICH GENERAL WESTMORELAND COULD ADVISE GENERAL WHEELER OF OUR INABILITY TO AGREE. KOMER WEIGHED IN WITH REPLAY OF HIS THESIS, RECOMMENDING ACCEPTANCE MACV POSITION BUT ACKNOWLEDGING LOGIC IN SOME OF WASHINGTON VIEWS. I THEN REVIEWED HISTORY AND CONTEXT WHOLE ESTIMATE, THE SAIGON DISCUSSIONS, AND THE RATIONALE BEHIND EACH OF THE JOINT WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVES FIGURES, AND (AS TACTFULLY AS POSSIBLE) THE WAY THE PROCEDURE THROUGH WHICH NATIONAL ESTIMATES PRODUCED REDUCED OUR NEGOTIATING LATITUDE. I ALSO TOOK UP "QUANTIFICATION PARAGRAPH", INDICATING THAT DAVIDSON HAD QUOTED OUT OF CONTEXT AND SHOWING WHY WE THOUGHT IT MET BOTH WASHINGTON AND MACV NEEDS. I CONCLUDED WITH GENERAL REMARKS TRACING HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY ESTIMATES ON VIETNAM SINCE 1956, NOTING THAT CONSISTENT RECORD OF UNDERESTIMATION PLUS RECENT (I.E. MCCHRISTIAN) METHODOLOGY WHICH REQUIRED CONSTANT RETROACTIVE JUGGLING HAD CONTRIBUTED MIGHTILY TO OUR

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CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS, THAT WE NEEDED BASELINE WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE ADJUSTED AGAIN, AND THAT WHEN IN DOUBT WE WELL ADVISED, FROM ALL ANGLES, TO ERR ON SIDE OF CAUTION RATHER THAN OPTIMISM.

4. WESTMORELAND MOST CORDIAL AND RECEPTIVE. SAID HE AGREED WITH MOST OF MY OBSERVATIONS AND COULD SEE THE CLEAR LOGIC BEHIND BOTH SETS OF FIGURES, WHICH WERE REALLY NOT THAT FAR APART. HE ALSO SAW THE RATIONALE BEHIND OUR "IRREGULAR QUANTIFICATION" PARAGRAPH AND HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH IT, THOUGH HE WOULD WANT TO TAKE A FINAL LOOK AT IT IN WRITING. HE ASKED IF I WOULD CONVENE BOTH THE WASHINGTON AND MACV ANALYSTS TO REVIEW THE EVIDENCE ONCE AGAIN AND SEE IF WE COULD RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES.

5. WHEN THE ANALYST MEETING WAS CONVENED (WITH DAVIDSON REPRESENTED BY HIS DEPUTY) I TOOK WESTMORELAND AT HIS WORD, USURPED THE CHAIR, AND ANNOUNCED THAT ALL CONSTRAINTS ON TOTALS WERE OFF AND WE COULD SETTLE DOWN TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF EVIDENCE AND ISSUES. DURING ABOUT FOUR HOURS OF BRISK DISCUSSION WE HAMMERED OUT THE FOLLOWING SET OF AGREED FIGURES, WHICH GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS ALREADY ENDORSED: MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE 119,000, ADMIN SERVICES 35,000-40,000, GUERRILLAS 70,000-90,000 FOR MILITARY TOTAL SPREAD OF 224,000-249,000. POLITICAL 75,000 TO 85,000,

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6. ON THE WHOLE, I THINK WE CAN LIVE QUITE COMFORTABLY WITH THE ABOVE FIGURES (WHICH THE DIA TEAM AND INR REP ENDORSE). WE HAVE NO DISPUTE ON THE MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE 119,000 FIGURE. THE TEXT OF THE OPERATIVE SENTENCE IN OUR ADMIN SERVICE PARAGRAPH (SEE REF A) NOW READS "IN LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WE ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE NOW AT LEAST 35,000-40,000 ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE PERSONNEL WHO ARE PERFORMING ESSENTIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS FULL TIME." THE REST OF THE PARAGRAPH IS UNCHANGED. WE GAVE A LITTLE COSMETICALLY BUT I THINK THIS PRESERVES THE ESSENCE OF THE JUDGMENT IN THE 14.3 DRAFT.

7. THERE HAS BEEN SOME ADJUSTMENT ON GUERRILLAS, BUT THE NEW FIGURE (70,000-90,000) APPRECIABLY LIFTS MACV'S PREVIOUS TOTAL (65,000) AND HAS THE SAME MEDIAN (80,000) AS THE SPREAD IN THE 14.3 DRAFT.

8. WE GAVE A LITTLE ON THE POLITICAL FIGURE, PARTLY TO KEEP MACV ON THE RESERVATION WITH RESPECT TO THE GUERRILLAS, PARTLY BECAUSE MACV DID HAVE A CASE ON DOUBLE COUNTING (SOME BODIES IN BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL FIGURES, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT THE REASON MACV WHACKED THE FIGURE YESTERDAY), AND PRIMARILY BECAUSE

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THE DISCUSSION AND EVIDENCE CONVINCED ME THAT THIS IS NOT A VERY GOOD FIGURE ANYWAY. OUR PRESENT DEFINITIONS ARE NOT ADEQUATE OR SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE, WE INCLUDE MUCH MORE THAN THE REAL "LEADERSHIP" AND EXCLUDE MANY (E.G. SECURITY ELEMENTS) OF WHOM FORMAL COGNIZANCE SHOULD BE TAKEN.

9. ON ABOVE, WITH ENDORSEMENT MESSRS. HYLAND AND [redacted] 25X1 AND DIA REPS AND CONCURRENCE GENERAL DAVIDSON, I AM INITIATING MAJOR STUDY TO REFINE OUR POLITICAL CATEGORIES AND HENCE IMPROVE OUR POLITICAL HOLDINGS. TO THIS END, MR. ADAMS WILL REMAIN SAIGON TO GO OVER WHOLE SUBJECT IN DETAIL WITH MACV ANALYSTS AND OUR ICEX OFFICERS. FURTHER WORK WILL THEN BE CARRIED ON IN WASHINGTON UNDER [redacted] 25X1 AEGIS.

10. OUR AGREED FIGURES AND IRREGULAR QUANTIFICATION PARAGRAPH BEING GIVEN GENERAL WESTMORELAND IN WRITING TOMORROW. ONCE HE ADDS SIGNATURE TO ALREADY EXPRESSED VERBAL APPROVAL OUR MISSION SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED. I HAVE 1500 HOURS APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR BUNKER ON 14 SEPTEMBER AND SHALL GIVE HIM FULL REPORT.

11. GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS REQUESTED I WORK WITH GENERAL DAVIDSON AND GENERAL SIDLE TO PREPARE SCENARIO FOR

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13 SEP 67 IN 51159

S E C R E T 131225Z CITE SAIGON 1988 [redacted] 25X1

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

FINAL SECTION OF 2

25X1 FOR [redacted]

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

PRESS BACKGROUNDER. I HAVE ACCEPTED SUBJECT YOUR CONCURRENCE. PLEASE ADVISE.

12. ON RETURNS, EARLY RESERVATIONS OUT OF SIAGON ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE OBTAIN. SUBJECT YOUR APPROVAL (PLEASE ADVISE IMMEDIATE) I HAVE AUTHORIZED MESSRS. [redacted] AND HYLAND USE 25X1 THEIR PRESENT 14 SEPTEMBER PANAM RESERVATIONS. I HAVE RESERVATION FOR 16 SEPTEMBER BUT WILL NOT LEAVE UNTIL YOU CONCUR. REQUEST OUR WIVES BE ADVISED OF THESE TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS.

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SEP 13 1530Z
DIR 35114

S E C R E T

TO: OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE SAIGON

25X1 FOR [redacted]

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

RE SAIGON 1988 (IN 51159), PARAGRAPH 12.*

WHOLE TEAM AUTHORIZED RETURN ANY TIME FROM NOW ON. IF YOU WANT TO WAIT UNTIL 16 SEPTEMBER, THAT IS ENTIRELY UP TO YOU. WIVES WILL BE ADVISE.

(END OF MESSAGE)

25X1

[redacted]

/S/
RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

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SECRET

SEP 13 1554Z
DIRECTOR 35119

IMMEDIATE
TO: SAIGON

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

RE SAIGON 1988 (IN 51159), REGARDING PARAGRAPH 11. *

1. HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR UNDERTAKING WHAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND ASKS, BUT DO NOT REPEAT NOT FEEL THAT SUCH PRESS BACKGROUNDS SHOULD BE RELATED IN ANY WAY TO NIE PROCESS. WILL MAKE DETERMINATION ONLY AFTER YOU RETURN HERE WHETHER OR NOT ESTIMATE WILL BE ISSUED.

2. PLEASE DO NOT REPEAT NOT OVER READ OR MISREAD WHAT I HAVE SAID ABOVE.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/S Comment: *General Westmoreland requested [redacted] work with 25X1
General Davidson and General Sidle to prepare
scenario for press backgrounder.

/S/
RICHARD HELSM
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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14 SEP 67 IN 52200

S E C R E T 141153Z CITE SAIGON 2043 [redacted] 25X1

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

25X1 RYBAT [redacted]

25X1 FOR [redacted]

1. GEN. WESTMORELAND HAS FORMALLY SIGNED OFF ON AGREED FIGURES AND IRREGULAR QUANTIFICATION PARAGRAPH. UNDERSTAND HE HAS FORMALLY REPORTED TO CHAIRMAN JCS THAT AGREEMENT ON FIGURES WAS REACHED AND HE HAS ENDORSED RESULT. THUS OUR BASIC MISSION NOW SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED.

2. I HAD GOOD SESSION WITH AMBASSADOR BUNKER, REPORTING OUR AGREEMENT WITH MACV AND OUTLINING SALIENT ELEMENTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS BUT OMITTING DETAILS NOW BETTER FORGOTTEN. HE REVIEWED AGREED FIGURES AND DRAFT PARAGRAPHS AND ENDORSED THEM WITHOUT RESERVATION. AMBASSADOR MOST PLEASED THAT WASHINGTON AND SAIGON COULD NOW SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE, WAS VERY COMPLIMENTARY ABOUT WASHINGTON DELEGATION MISSION AND SAID WESTMORELAND HAD ALREADY PHONED HIM TO

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RELAY SIMILAR VIEWS.

3. AT BUNKER REQUEST, WE THEN ENGAGED IN NOTE AND IMPRESSION COMPARING DISCUSSION OF CURRENT POLITICAL SCENE, PARTICULARLY KY-THIEU RELATIONSHIP. AMBASSADOR HAD HIGH PRAISE FOR STATION AND SUPPORT IT GIVES HIM. HE MADE PARTICULAR POINT OF

25X1 PRAISING [redacted] PERFORMANCE AND PROFESSIONALISM, IN WHICH BUNKER OBVIOUSLY HAS GREAT CONFIDENCE.

4. AFTER BUNKER SESSION, I SPENT TWO HOURS WITH GEN. SIDLE, MACV PIO, DISCUSSING SCENARIO FOR PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON NEW FIGURES. MACV, PRESENTATION WILL MAKE NO MENTION WHATSOEVER OF NIE.

5. ONLY REMAINING TASK IS MENDING OF PERSONAL FENCES WITH GEN. DAVIDSON. HE IS ABLE OFFICER WITH WHOM STATION MUST DEAL CLOSELY AND WITH WHOM WE

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IN WASHINGTON SHOULD MAINTAIN RECIPROCALLY USEFUL COMMUNICATION. DAVIDSON AND I MEETING FOR DRINKS ON 15 SEPTEMBER.

6. EARLIEST AVAILABLE RESERVATION IS PAN AM 2 ON 16 SEPTEMBER. WILL STOP AT HONOLULU TO BRIEF CINCPAC STAFF AS PROMISED AND WILL BE AT HQS OOB TUESDAY 19 SEPTEMBER.

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14 SEP 67 IN 52035

S E C R E T 141153Z CITE SAIGON 2044 [redacted] 25X1

25X1 DIRECTOR [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 1. [redacted]

SAIGON PANAM 2 14 SEPT. [redacted] 25X1

TAKING LEAVE EN ROUTE AND WILL ADVISE

HIS ETA WASHINGTON. MY HYLAND ETA

DULLES 1640 HOURS SATURDAY 16 SEPTEMBER

UNITED FLT 52.

2. MR. CARVER WILL DEPART SAIGON

25X1 16 SEPT ON PAN AM 2 FOR HONOLULU. [redacted]

ARRIVAL. HE HAS RESERVATIONS AT HAWAIIAN VILLAGE HOTEL.

3. MR. CARVER ETA DULLES 1640 HOURS

MONDAY, 18 SEPTEMBER VIA UNITED 52.

4. REQUEST WIVES BE INFORMED ABOVE

TRAVEL DETAILS.

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